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This paper introduces an axiomatic model for bargaining analysis. We describe a bargaining
situation in propositional logic and represent bargainers’ preferences in total pre-orders.
Based on the concept of minimal simultaneous concessions, we propose a solution to
n-person bargaining problems and prove that the solution is uniquely characterized
by ﬁve logical axioms: Consistency, Comprehensiveness, Collective rationality, Disagreement,
and Contraction independence. This framework provides a naive solution to multi-person,
multi-issue bargaining problems in discrete domains. Although the solution is purely
qualitative, it can also be applied to continuous bargaining problems through a procedure
of discretization, in which case the solution coincides with the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.
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1. Introduction
As one of the most fundamental models in modern economic theory, the Nash bargaining solution [23] has been de-
veloped into a highly sophisticated theory with extensive applications in economics, social science, political science and
management science [1,13,23,24,26,40,42]. Computer scientists, especially researchers in the area of artiﬁcial intelligence
(AI), have found it useful in modeling interactions among distributed computer systems and autonomous software agents
since the early 90s [12,17,30,38]. Many applications have been developed for the design and evaluation of high-level inter-
action protocols among autonomous agents for task assignment, resource allocation, conﬂict resolution, electronic trading
and web services [16,27,30,41,48].
Traditionally, a bargaining situation is modeled as a numerical game, using the language of utility. In his seminal paper,
Nash [23] deﬁned a bargaining situation as a pair (S,d), where S ⊆ 2 represents the set of utility pairs that can be derived
from possible agreements and d ∈ S is the utility pair that follows disagreement.1 A solution is a rule that associates to
each bargaining situation (S,d) a feasible utility pair of S . Nash proposed a set of axioms that he thought a solution should
satisfy and established the existence of a unique solution satisfying all the axioms [23]. Numerous extensions and alternative
solutions have been proposed in the past sixty years after this ﬁrst axiomatic model of bargaining [42]. The subsequent
work has diverged in two different directions: the cooperative models and the non-cooperative models. The former, following
Nash’s approach and thus also called axiomatic models, provide an axiomatic characterization of bargaining solutions [23,42].
A bargaining problem is modelled as a one-shot game and solutions are characterized by a set of axioms, such as Pareto
optimality, Symmetry, and so on. The non-cooperative models, also called strategic models, establish explicit constructions of
negotiation procedures and identify the bargaining outcome as an equilibrium [1]. The attempt to establish the relationship
between the two models is known as the Nash program [1,24].
The Nash bargaining model provides simple and mathematically elegant solutions to bargaining problems and facilitates
quantitative analysis of bargaining situations. However, in many real-world bargaining situations, the utility of a bargainer
E-mail address: d.zhang@uws.edu.au.
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Examples of such bargaining situations can be easily found in political/legal negotiations, household bargaining, labor dis-
putes and so on. For instance, it is diﬃcult to imagine an analysis of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program
that is based on a numerical measure of each party’s utility gains or losses from the negotiations.3
An alternative method of bargaining analysis, initially suggested by Shapley and Shubik, is modeling a bargaining situa-
tion in terms of bargainers’ preference orderings over possible agreements [40, p. 91]. Formally, a bargaining situation can
be represented as a tuple (A, D,1,2), where A is a set of possible agreements (described in physical terms), D is the
disagreement, and 1 and 2 are preference orderings over A ∪ {D}. The interpretation is that ai b if and only if player i
either prefers a to b or is indifferent [26, p. 9]. This allows us to assess a bargainer’s utility through pairwise comparisons
among the possible agreements instead of quantitative measurement. Such a model of bargaining problems is called an
ordinal bargaining model. A bargaining solution is ordinal if it can be built on an ordinal bargaining model. We would like
to remark that a bargaining solution built on the Nash bargaining model can also be ordinal as long as it is invariant un-
der any order-preserving transformations of utilities (ordinal invariance) because such a solution can be expressed in an
ordinal model [31]. Therefore the judgement of whether a solution is ordinal or cardinal is not by the use of numbers but
its structure. In fact, most of the existing work on ordinal bargaining solutions in the literature was built on numerical
models [3,25,35,37].
The ordinal bargaining models are of interest because ordinal information is relatively easier to obtain than cardinal util-
ities [36]. Asked if they prefer coffee or tea, anyone can provide a preference. However, if asked to value their preference in
cardinal scale, they would ﬁnd it diﬃcult [8]. Nevertheless, Shapley observed that there is no non-trivial ordinal bargaining
solution to two-player bargaining problems [39].4 The reason is, as pointed out by many researchers, that the information
about bargainers’ attitudes towards risk, which in fact determines the negotiation power of a bargainer, is not describable by
ordinal preferences [26,31,40].5 With the Nash bargaining model, bargainers’ risk attitudes, combined with the preferences
on the possible agreements, are represented by utility scales, i.e., cardinal utility, through the non-linearity or curvature of
utility functions (for an intuitive example see [44]). However, such information is lost when the model is converted to an
ordinal model through an order-preserving transformation. Therefore the information about bargainers’ risk attitudes is lost.
This suggests that additional components have to be introduced to the ordinal bargaining models to express bargainers’ risk
attitudes.
Rubinstein et al. introduced a variation of the ordinal bargaining model in which the preference ordering of each player
is extended to the space of lotteries over the possible agreements and the disagreement [33]. A player can express her
attitudes towards risk through her preference on the lotteries. However, an ordinal preference on the lotteries is by no
means easier to elicit than the utility scales on the possible agreements because the space of lotteries is also a continuum.
More recently, O’Neill et al. introduced an ordinal bargaining solution based on the idea of gradual bargaining [25]. Instead of
modeling a bargaining problem as a one-shot game, they look at bargaining as a family of bargaining games, parameterized
by time. The bargaining outcome can then be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement
of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. Players’ risk attitudes can then be observed through
the variations of their utilities over time. However, there is no explicit representation of players’ attitudes towards risk.
Zhang and Zhang proposed a purely qualitative model of bargaining based on bargainers’ ordinal preferences [44]. Similar
to but different from Rubinstein et al.’s framework, the preference ordering of each player is deﬁned on the player’s demand
items (instead of the lotteries of possible agreements). More precisely, the physical demands of each player are expressed
by logical statements. A possible agreement is a logically consistent set of demands from each player. The risk attitudes of
a player are represented based on a relative ranking of the player’s demands: a risk-lover tends to insist on conﬂicting demands
more ﬁrmly than a risk-averse player and therefore may rank these conﬂicting demands higher, and vice versa. Bargaining then is
viewed as a procedure of conﬂict resolution over two sets of ranked demands (for two-player bargaining). A solution concept
was proposed based on minimal changes but no axiomatic characterization was provided [44].
This paper will develop an axiomatic model of bargaining based on the ordinal preference structure proposed in [44]. We
describe a bargaining situation in propositional logic and represent bargainers’ preferences in total pre-orders. Following the
tradition of cooperative bargaining theory, we assume that any negotiation is conducted through an impartial arbitrator who
has complete information about the negotiation [22, Chapter 8].6 The agreement of a negotiation is the outcome of a se-
quence of concessions simultaneously made by all players. We assume that whenever a player has to make a concession, she
always tries to make the concession as small as possible provided it is enough to break even. Based on the assumptions, we
propose a bargaining solution and establish that it is uniquely characterized by ﬁve plausible logical axioms. Our approach
2 More precisely, most classical bargaining solutions built on the Nash bargaining model assume that individuals’ utility scales can be deﬁned up to
separate increasing linear transformations. Such a utility measurement is often referred to as cardinal utility and a bargaining solution built on cardinal
utilities is called a cardinal solution [40, p. 98].
3 As Rubinstein comments “the language of utility allows the use of geometrical presentations and facilitates analysis; in contrast, the numerical presentation results
in an unnatural statement of the axioms and the solutions” [34, p. 83].
4 More precisely, the result says that a two-player bargaining problem has no single-valued solution satisfying ordinal invariance and strong individual
rationality (see also [31, p. 70]).
5 Although it was found, also by Shapley himself, that Shapley’s impossibility result does not apply to three-player bargaining problems, the problem of
representing risk attitudes in ordinal structures still exists.
6 A cooperative model of bargaining can also be used as a tool for off-line analysis of bargaining situations and for predicting bargaining outcomes.
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strate that the solution is applicable also to the continuous bargaining problems through a procedure of discretization, in
which case the solution converges to the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will introduce a logic-based bargaining model to specify
arbitrary n-person bargaining games. Section 3 will introduce the axioms and construct the solution based on the extended
model. Section 4 contains our main result, the axiomatic characterization. In Section 5, we will use a typical game-theoretic
bargaining problem to show that the proposed solution is also applicable to the continuous bargaining problem even though
it is best suited to multi-issue, discrete bargaining problems. In Section 6, we conclude the work with a discussion of the
related work. Finally, to make the paper self-contained, we list the basic facts of the two most inﬂuential game-theoretic
bargaining solutions, the Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.
2. The bargaining model
Bargaining is a process through which a set of agents interact to reach an agreement. To model a bargaining situation, we
describe the demands of each bargainer in logical statements. The demands of the bargainers may conﬂict, and therefore
collectively, they may be logically inconsistent. Successful bargaining will result in a mutually acceptable agreement that
compromises the demands of the bargainers into logically consistent statements.
To facilitate a logical model of bargaining, we assume a propositional language L. The language consists of a ﬁnite
set of propositional variables and the standard propositional connectives {¬,∨,∧,→}. We will apply the standard syntax
and semantics of propositional logic. Propositional sentences will be denoted by ϕ,ψ, . . . . As usual, the symbol 	 denotes
derivability, and the concept of logical consistency is deﬁned as usual.
Let  be a binary relation on a non-empty set X .  is a total pre-order, or complete transitive reﬂexive order, on X if it
satisﬁes the following properties:
• Completeness or totality: For all ϕ,ψ ∈ X , ϕ ψ or ψ  ϕ .
• Reﬂexivity: For all ϕ ∈ X , ϕ  ϕ .
• Transitivity: For all ϕ,ψ,χ ∈ X , if ϕ ψ and ψ  χ , then ϕ  χ .
2.1. Demands of a bargainer
Given a bargaining situation with n participants, assume that the ﬁnal agreement is represented by a collection of logical
statements in the language we speciﬁed above. Each participant in the bargaining requests that the ﬁnal agreement contains
a set of statements, which are referred to as the demands of the bargainer.7 For example, a buyer in a price negotiation may
have the demands “the price of the product is no more than $10” and “the warranty is no fewer than three years”. In addition,
we assume that each bargainer has a preference on the statements of her demands, indicating how eagerly she wants the
statements to be written in the ﬁnal agreement. Formally, we can represent a bargainer’s demands and preferences in the
following structure:
Deﬁnition 1. A demand set in L is a pair (X,), where X is a ﬁnite, logically consistent set of sentences in L and  is
a total pre-order on X .
As mentioned above, a demand set represents the statements an agent wants the agreement of a negotiation to stipulate.
The ordering of the demand set represents how ﬁrmly the agent insists on her demands: the higher the ﬁrmer. In some
situations, such an ordering can be recorded by observing the sequence of demands the agent gives up during a course of
bargaining: the later it is dropped, the ﬁrmer. Note that the preference ordering of a player does not represent the payoff the
player receives from the associated demands. For instance, suppose that two players bargain over the partition of a cake
(Section 5). A player receives the highest payoff if she gets the whole cake. However, getting the whole cake should be the
least entrenched demand for a player unless she does not want to reach an agreement, because if both players insist on
the demand, no agreement could be reached. In addition, the preference ordering of a player is purely private information.
A player can get great advantage if she knows other players’ preference orderings. However, how to take advantage of other
players’ information is a research topic of strategic models (or called non-cooperative models) of bargaining [1].
We would like to remark that, in general, the demand set of a player is non-empty, which means that no player would
participate in a negotiation for nothing. However, we will use the empty demand set (∅,) to indicate the situation in
which a player discontinues a negotiation.
Let (X,) be a demand set. For any ϕ,ψ ∈ X , we write ϕ ≈ ψ to denote ϕ  ψ and ψ  ϕ . Obviously ≈ is an equiva-
lence relation on X . Furthermore, ϕ  ψ denotes ϕ  ψ but ψ  ϕ . Occasionally we also use  and ≺ as the reverse order
of  and , respectively.
7 We call these statements “demands” but they may be the player’s beliefs, goals, desired constraints or commonsense; whatever the player wants the
ﬁnal agreement to contain.
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S ⊆ n+ is called to be comprehensive if for all x, y ∈ n+ , x ∈ S and y  x implies y ∈ S [42]. In belief revision, we also have
a similar concept, called cut [10].
Deﬁnition 2. Given a demand set (X,), a subset Y of X is comprehensive w.r.t. X if for any ϕ ∈ Y , ψ ∈ X and ψ  ϕ
implies ψ ∈ Y .
In other words, if Y contains an item of X , it contains all the items of X that are at least as ﬁrmly kept as this item. In
another view, a comprehensive subset is always an upper segment of the original set, i.e., a cut of X .
2.2. Bargaining game
With the representation of a single agent’s demands, we are now able to describe a bargaining situation with multiple
agents. Consider a ﬁnite set N = {1,2, . . . ,n} of agents or players where n 2. We model an n-agent bargaining problem as
follows:
Deﬁnition 3. An n-agent bargaining game is a tuple ((X1,1), . . . , (Xn,n)), where (Xi,i) is the demand set of agent i
in L.
We also write a bargaining game as ((Xi,i))i∈N . The set of all n-agent bargaining games in language L is denoted by
Gn,L .
There are two special kinds of bargaining situations. The ﬁrst kind is that one of the agents discontinues an ongoing
negotiation by withdrawing all her demands. In such a case, we consider that the negotiation procedure terminates with a
disagreement. The second special kind of bargaining situations is that there is no conﬂict among the demands from all the
players in a negotiation, therefore no arbitration or compromises are actually needed. Formally, we introduce the following
concepts:
Deﬁnition 4. A bargaining game ((Xi,i))i∈N is said to represent a disagreement situation if Xk = ∅ for some k. It is said to
be non-conﬂictive if it does not represent a disagreement situation and
⋃
i∈N Xi is logically consistent.
For a better understanding of the above bargaining model, let us consider a negotiation scenario.
Example 1. Two political parties in the Parliament bargain over a government rescue plan in response to the 2008 ﬁnan-
cial crisis. Each party may identify speciﬁc beneﬁts from a different approach and therefore propose different rescue plans.
Party A wants to put almost all the available funds into the major banks but leave a small portion for creating job opportuni-
ties. Party B has a close relationship with the automobile industry and thus insists on investing in car manufacturers. Party B
also proposes that some money should be spent on helping people who hold signiﬁcant mortgage debt.8 Both parties know
that there is no need to give money to both sides of house mortgages: mortgagees and mortgagers. Also both parties real-
ize that if putting money in both auto industry and ﬁnancial institutions, the government will incur unprecedented heavy
deﬁcit. However, Party A holds a low deﬁcit policy.9
Suppose that we let
cars: “rescue automobile industry”;
banks: “rescue the major banks”;
mortgagers: “help house mortgagers”;
jobs: “create job opportunities”;
deﬁcit: “heavy government deﬁcit”.
Then Party A’s demands can be written as
XA =
{
banks, jobs,¬deﬁcit,¬(banks∧mortgagers), (cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit}
and Party B’s demands are
XB =
{
cars,mortgagers,¬(banks∧mortgagers), (cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit}
Now suppose that Party A’s preference on its demands is:
8 For instance, there were some house owners whose property values became even lower than their mortgage debts after the ﬁnancial crisis.
9 The scenario was reﬁned by taking one of the anonymous reviewers’ suggestions.
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Party B’s preference is:
¬(banks∧mortgagers) ≈B (cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit B carsB mortgagers
Therefore, the bargaining problem can be modeled by the game ((XA,A), (XB ,B)). Obviously we cannot satisfy all
demands from both parties (i.e., write all the demands into the ﬁnal agreement) because they are logically inconsistent. The
inconsistency can be identiﬁed as follows:
• banks,mortgagers,¬(banks∧mortgagers) 	 ⊥,
• cars,banks,¬deﬁcit, (cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit 	 ⊥.
One may notice that the statements ‘¬(banks∧mortgagers)’ and ‘(cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit’ are more like constraints than
demands. Both of the parties request writing these statements into the ﬁnal agreement because the statements also repre-
sent the parties’ standpoints. For Party B, if Party A does not agree on ¬(banks∧mortgagers), she will not go on. However,
dropping this statement can be an option of Party A if she has chance to keep other more crucial demands. Therefore
a demand of a player can be a standpoint the player wants the agreement to support.
2.3. Subgames
A bargaining situation changes with the progress of bargaining. The following concepts capture the relationship between
the bargaining situations before and after players make concessions.
Deﬁnition 5. Given a bargaining game G = ((Xi,i))i∈N , a bargaining game G ′ = ((X ′i,′i))i∈N is a subgame of G , denoted
by G ′  G , if for all i ∈ N ,
1. X ′i is a comprehensive subset of Xi ,
2. ′i =i ∩(X ′i × X ′i).
Furthermore, G ′ is a proper subgame of G , denoted by G ′  G , if X ′i ⊂ Xi for all i ∈ N .
Intuitively, a subgame represents a contraction of the original problem: a few players make concessions by dropping some
demands. The ﬁrst condition requires each agent to retain its most preferred segment of demands whenever a concession is
made. The second condition requires each agent to retain their preference ordering.
We remark that, to be a proper subgame, each player has to make a concession, i.e., X ′i ⊂ X . Therefore, we can view
a subgame as the result of a concession made by all players simultaneously, i.e., a simultaneous concession. Note that G ′  G
and G ′  G do not imply G ′ = G (due to a bargaining game being a vector).
Deﬁnition 6. G ′ is the maximal proper subgame of G , denoted by G ′ max G , if
1. G ′  G;
2. G ′′  G implies G ′′  G ′ .
The concept of a maximal proper subgame in fact captures the idea of minimal simultaneous concessions: “if every
agent has to make a concession, what is the smallest step an agent can take?” The ﬁrst condition requires every agent to make
a concession, that is, the concession is done simultaneously by all agents. The second condition guarantees that there is no
other simultaneous concession with fewer losses of demands. Note that the minimal loss or maximal gain we identify here
is not simply in quantity, but more importantly in quality. Each agent gives up only their least preferred demands.
3. Bargaining solution
We have presented an n-person bargaining model with logical representation of demands and ordinal representation of
preferences. In this section, we propose a solution concept based on this bargaining model.
3.1. Solution concept and the axioms
Generally speaking, the outcome of bargaining is an agreement or contract that is accepted by all players. Therefore the
major concern of a player is which and how many demands of the player are included in the ﬁnal agreement. Formally,
given a bargaining game G = ((Xi,i))i∈N , a possible outcome of the game is a tuple (O 1, . . . , On) such that O i ⊆ Xi for
all i. The agreement with respect to the possible outcome can then be deﬁned as
⋃
i∈N O i .
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game. In other words, for any G = ((Xi,i))i∈N , f (G) = ( f1(G), . . . , fn(G)), where f i(G) ⊆ Xi . We will write f i(G) as the
i-th component of f (G).
⋃
i∈N fi(G) is called the agreement of the game, denoted by A(G).
We now consider what properties a solution should have. Following the tradition of cooperative bargaining theory, we
call these properties axioms.
We require ﬁrst that a bargaining solution should resolve all possible conﬂicts in the demands. In other words, the
agreement needs to be logically consistent.
Axiom 1 (Consistency).
⋃
i∈N fi(G) is consistent.
The next axiom assumes that whenever an agent has to make a concession, she should only consider giving up those
least preferred demands (see Deﬁnition 2).
Axiom 2 (Comprehensiveness). f i(G) is comprehensive for all i.
The following two axioms specify two special situations of bargaining. The ﬁrst axiom deals with the situation when
there is no conﬂict among the players’ demands. In such a case we assume that all players mutually accept each others’
demands. The concept of a non-conﬂict bargaining game is referred to Deﬁnition 4.
Axiom 3 (Collective rationality). If G is non-conﬂictive, then f i(G) = Xi for all i.
The second special case deals with the disagreement situations, that is, there is a k such that Xk = ∅ (see Deﬁnition 4).
In such a case, no agreement is reached.
Axiom 4 (Disagreement). If G represents a disagreement situation, then f i(G) = ∅ for all i.
The ﬁnal axiom requires that a bargaining solution should be independent of any minimal simultaneous concession of
the bargaining game unless no concession is needed. Obviously the axiom is an analog to Nash’s Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) (see Appendix A).10
Axiom 5 (Contraction independence). If G ′ max G , then f (G) = f (G ′) unless G is non-conﬂictive.
Recall that G ′ max G represents that G ′ is a maximal proper subgame of G , which means that G ′ is a minimal simulta-
neous concession of G (see Deﬁnition 6). The axiom actually implies another assumption: “Whenever a bargaining situation
requires a compromise due to conﬂicting demands, every agent has to make a concession by dropping a number of demands.” The
axiom says, if each agent gives up only a minimal number of the least preferred demands, the bargaining solution should
not be affected because all the highly preferred demands of all players remain in the subgame.
3.2. Solution construction
In this subsection we seek a concrete bargaining solution that can be exactly characterized by the axioms we proposed
in the previous section. Before we present the formal construction of our bargaining solution, let us describe the intuition
behind the construction.
A bargaining solution can be interpreted as an arbitration procedure; i.e., a rule an arbitrator uses to decide what out-
come to select [31]. Suppose now that a negotiation is carried out through the following arbitration procedure. At the
beginning of the negotiation, all participants submit their demands to the arbitrator who is in charge of the negotiation. If
there is no conﬂict among the demands, the negotiation terminates and the agreement is simply the collection of all the
demands; otherwise, the negotiation moves to the next stage, in which each agent has two options: make a concession
by withdrawing a number of demands (an agent is not allowed to add new demands), or declare a breakdown, in which
case the negotiation terminates with an empty agreement.11 The procedure continues until the remaining demands are
consistent.
The following subsections will formalize the procedure.
10 This axiom is also referred to as contraction independence [42].
11 We could consider another possibility that the negotiation continues with one less agent. However, no matter whether an agreement is reached in the
reduced game or not, the agreement should not be considered as the agreement of the original game because at least one player does not agree.
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3.2.1. Demand hierarchies
Given a demand set (Xi,i) of player i where Xi = ∅, we can deﬁne an equivalence relation ≈ on Xi in terms of the
ordering i (see Section 2.1).12 Let {X1i , . . . , XLii }, or {Xli}Lil=1 in short, be the partition of Xi induced by the equivalence
relation ≈. We assume that this partition satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. Xli ⊆ Xi and Xli = ∅ for all l (1 l Li);
2. Xi =⋃Lil=1 Xli ;
3. Xki ∩ Xli = ∅ for any k = l;
4. for any ϕ ∈ Xki and ψ ∈ Xli , ϕ ≺ ψ if and only if k < l.
Furthermore, we extend the partition into an inﬁnite sequence {Xli}+∞l=1 , simply assuming that Xl = ∅ when l > Li . Note
that with the special case that Xi = ∅, we assume that Li = 0. We call {Xl}+∞l=1 the hierarchy of the demand set (Xi,) and Li
is called the height of the hierarchy.




i . In particular, X
>0
i = Xi .
3.2.2. The simultaneous concession solution
Now we present the construction of our bargaining solution.




(X>μ1 , . . . , X
>μ
n ), if μ < L
(∅, . . . ,∅), otherwise
where L = mini∈N Li and μ = min{k: ⋃ni=1 X>ki is consistent}. We call L the height of G and μ is the minimal rounds of
concessions of the game.
The construction of the simultaneous solution actually simulates the arbitration procedure described in the beginning
of Section 3.2. Given a bargaining game, if the game represents a disagreement situation (there is an agent who has an
empty demand), then the height of the game is zero, i.e., L = 0. In this case, no agreement is reached (empty agreement).
If the game is non-conﬂictive, then μ = 0. In this case, Fi(G) = X>0i = Xi for all i. No agent has to make any concession. In
the cases when the arbitration procedure has to run a few rounds, each agent makes a minimal concession in each round.
Here a minimal concession means whenever a player has to make a concession, she always gives up all the least preferred
demands in her demand hierarchy.13 Based on the assumption, after μ rounds, all the remaining demands are consistent. In
the case when one agent has nothing to give up (μ L), we assume that the agent will declare a breakdown. In all other
cases, the negotiation will end up with all the remaining demands. Fig. 1 illustrates the construction of the solution. The
dashed rectangle contains the demands that constitute the solution.
Example 2. Based on the bargaining game described in Example 1, the demand hierarchies of these two parties can be
illustrated by the following table (the higher the more preferred):
12 Note that this equivalence relation has nothing to do with logical equivalence. Two logically equivalent statements can belong to difference equivalent
classes.
13 Thinking in Experimental Economics, this gives us a way to observe a bargainer’s demand hierarchy.
1314 D. Zhang / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1307–1322Party A Party B
(cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit
¬deﬁcit




It is easy to see that LA = 4, LB = 3 and μ = 2. The simultaneous concession solution of the game is:
F A(G) =
{
(cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit,¬deﬁcit,¬(banks∧mortgagers)}
FB(G) =
{
(cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit,¬(banks∧mortgagers)}
Then, the outcome of the negotiation (the agreement) is:
A(G) = {(cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit,¬deﬁcit,¬(banks∧mortgagers)}
which means that none of the proposed rescue plans were passed except that Party A’s low-deﬁcit policy is conﬁrmed.
As mentioned in Section 1, the most diﬃculty establishing an ordinal bargaining theory is that the language of ordinal
utility is less expressive than the language of cardinal utility. An ordinal bargaining theory has to offer a way to express
bargainers’ attitudes towards risk. The following example demonstrates how this can be done with our model.
Example 3. Consider the bargaining game in Example 1 again. Suppose that Party A has an additional demand, named
coffee, meaning requesting a cup of coffee. The demand hierarchy is reordered as follows (Party B’s demands and preference
remain the same):
Party A Party B
(cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit
¬deﬁcit
¬(banks∧mortgagers)




It is not hard to calculate that the simultaneous concession solution gives the following outcome:{¬deﬁcit, (cars∧ banks) → deﬁcit,¬(banks∧mortgagers),banks}
Obviously, Party A gets beneﬁt from the extra demand, which actually helps it delay one compulsory concession. We
call such a demand a dummy demand.14 A dummy demand can be placed anywhere in the demand hierarchy to represent
a desired delay of concession.15 It is easy to see that the use of dummy demands mimics the non-linearity of cardinal
preferences.
It is worth mentioning that delaying a compulsory concessions is risky. If Party B instead were more aggressive, as
shown in the demand hierarchy below (nothing negotiable except mortgagers), the outcome of the bargaining would have
been totally different.
Party A Party B








14 More precisely, a dummy demand is a demand that does not conﬂict with other demands. The use of the dummy demand was ﬁrstly proposed by
Zhang and Zhang [44].
15 There are also many other ways to delay a compulsory concession, such as reclaiming an equivalent statement.
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In general, a player can express her attitudes towards risk via her schedule of concessions. A risk-averse player may
choose to give up the demands that more likely contradict other players’ demands in an earlier stage of a negotiation in
order to increase the possibility of reaching an agreement. Thus she may give these demands lower preference. In contrast,
a risk-loving player could place less radical demands or a dummy demand at lower levels of her demand hierarchy to
protract a negotiation and gain more bargaining power.
4. Characterization
We now establish that the axioms we presented in Section 3.1 exactly characterize the simultaneous concession solution
deﬁned in Section 3.2.2.
4.1. The main theorem
Theorem 1. A bargaining solution is the simultaneous concession solution F if and only if it satisﬁes the axioms: Consistency, Com-
prehensiveness, Collective rationality, Disagreement, and Contraction independence.
The proof of the theorem requires the following technical lemma.
Lemma 1. Let G ′ be the maximal proper subgame of G = ((Xi,i))i∈N . Then G ′ = ((X>1i ,′i))i∈N , where ′i =i ∩ (X>1i × X>1i ).
Proof. Firstly, for all i ∈ N , Xi = ∅ because G has at least one proper subgame G ′ . Thus Xi = X>1i , or X>1i ⊂ Xi , for all i.
Obviously for each i ∈ N , X>1i is a comprehensive subset of Xi . Therefore we have ((X>1i ,′i))i∈N  G .
Secondly, let G ′′ = ((X ′′i ,′′i ))i∈N be any proper subgame of G , we prove that G ′′  ((X>1i ,′i))i∈N . Note that X>1i =
Xi \ X1i . Let ϕ ∈ X ′′i . Since G ′′ is a subgame of G , we know that ϕ ∈ Xi . Now let us assume that ψ ∈ Xi . If ϕ ∈ X1i , we
have ψ i ϕ . By the comprehensiveness of X ′′i , we yield that ψ ∈ X ′′i . This means that Xi ⊆ X ′′i . However, G ′′ is a proper
subgame of G , which implies X ′′i ⊂ Xi , a contradiction. It turns out that ϕ /∈ X1i . We yield that ϕ ∈ X>1i . We have proven
that X ′′i ⊆ X>1i for all i ∈ N , which implies that ((X ′′i ,′′i ))i∈N  ((X>1i ,′i))i∈N .
According to Deﬁnition 6, the above arguments imply that ((X>1i ,′i))i∈N is the maximal proper subgame of G (obviously
one game can have at most one maximal proper subgame). 
Proof of Theorem 1. “⇒”. We prove that F satisﬁes all the axioms.
Firstly, it is easy to show that F satisﬁes Consistency. In fact, for any G = ((Xi,i))i∈N , if μ  L, F (G) = (∅, . . . ,∅);




i is consistent. In both cases,
⋃
i∈N Fi(G) is consistent.
To show F satisﬁes Comprehensiveness, for all i, if Fi(G) = ∅, Fi(G) is a comprehensive subset of Xi ; otherwise, we
assume that ϕ ∈ Fi(G). Thus ϕ ∈ X>μi . Let ϕ ∈ Xki where k > μ. Given any ψ ∈ Xi , let ψ ∈ Xli . If ψ  ϕ , we have l  k.
Therefore ψ ∈ X>μi , which implies ψ ∈ Fi(G).
To see that F satisﬁes Collective rationality, let G = ((X1,1), . . . , (Xn,n)) be a non-conﬂictive bargaining game (see
Deﬁnition 4). In such a situation, it is easy to know that L  1 and μ = 0. It then follows from the solution construction
that for each i, Fi(G) = X>0i = Xi , as desired.
Obviously F satisﬁes Disagreement because if a game represents a disagreement situation (see Deﬁnition 4), L = 0 but
μ 0, which implies μ < L.
Finally we prove that F satisﬁes Contraction independence. Consider a bargaining game G = ((Xi,i))i∈N . In the case
when L = 0, there exists a k such that Xk = ∅, which means that G has no proper subgame. Therefore F satisﬁes the axiom
trivially. We then can assume that L > 0. In the case that μ = 0, the game is non-conﬂictive because ⋃i∈N Xi is consistent
and Xi = ∅ for all i. This situation has been excluded by the axiom. We can now assume that μ > 0. Let G ′ = ((X ′i,′i))i∈N
be the maximal proper subgame of G . We write L′ and μ′ to represent the height and the minimal rounds of concessions
of G ′ . According to Lemma 1, for each i, we have X ′i = X>1i and ′i =i ∩ (X ′i × X ′i). Obviously, L′ = L − 1 and μ′ = μ − 1.
Therefore, μ < L if and only if μ′ < L′ . In the case that μ L, F (G) = F (G ′) = (∅, . . . ,∅). In the other case when μ < L, we
have F (G) = (X>μ1 , . . . , X>μn ) and F (G ′) = (X ′>μ
′
1 , . . . , X
′>μ′



















X ′ki = X ′>μ
′
i (1)
Therefore F (G) = F (G ′).
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agreement, and Contraction independence. We show that for any bargaining game G = ((Xi,i))i∈N , f (G) = F (G) by induction
on μ.
For the base case that μ = 0, we know that ⋃i∈N Xi is consistent. If there is a k such that Xk = ∅, then G represents
a disagreement situation. By the axiom Disagreement, we have f (G) = (∅, . . . ,∅). On the other hand, for any disagreement
game, we have L = 0. Thus μ < L, which implies that F (G) = (∅, . . . ,∅) by the construction of F . Therefore, f (G) = F (G).
If Xi = ∅ for all i, G is a non-conﬂictive game. By Collective rationality, we have f (G) = (X1, . . . , Xn). Meanwhile, F (G) =
(X>01 , . . . , X
>0
n ) = (X1, . . . , Xn). Therefore we also have f (G) = F (G).
Now we assume that for any game G ′ such that μ′ = k, f (G ′) = F (G ′). We consider a game G = ((Xi,i))i∈N with
which μ = k + 1. If G represents a disagreement situation, then the height of the game L = 0. By Disagreement, we have
f (G) = (∅, . . . ,∅). Since μ  L, by the construction of F , we have F (G) = (∅, . . . ,∅). Therefore f (G) = F (G). Now we
consider the non-trivial case in which L > 0. Let G ′ = ((X ′i,′i))i∈N , where
1. X ′i = X>1i , and
2. ′i =i ∩ (X ′i × X ′i).
Since L > 0 with respect to game G , we have that X ′i = Xi for all i. Thus G ′ is a proper subgame of G . By Lemma 1, G ′ is




)= F (G ′)= (X ′>μ′1 , . . . , X ′>μ′n )
According to Contraction independence, we have
f (G) = f (G ′)= (X ′>μ′1 , . . . , X ′>μ′n )
Similar to Eq. (1), we have X ′>μ
′
i = X>μi for each i. Therefore
f (G) = (X>μ1 , . . . , X>μn )= F (G)
That is, f (G) = F (G). 
4.2. Game-theoretic properties of the bargaining solution
Among the axioms that characterize the simultaneous concession solution, Axioms 1, 3 and 4 are purely logical proper-
ties. Axioms 2 and 5, although represented in logical form, are rooted in game theory. Axiom 2 is the logical counterpart
of comprehensiveness, which is a fundamental assumption in cooperative bargaining theory [42]. Axiom 5 is an analogue
of Nash’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (see Appendix A). One may wonder whether the simultaneous concession
solution satisﬁes other game-theoretic properties, such as Pareto optimality, Individual rationality, and so on.
It is worth mentioning that there is a subtle difference between the standard game-theoretic ordinal bargaining model
and our model. The preference orderings in the classical ordinal model are deﬁned based on the set of possible outcomes,
while in our model the preference orderings are based on the demand set of each player. To examine the game-theoretic
properties of the bargaining solutions in our model, we need to restate these properties in our language.
Given a bargaining game G = ((X1,1), . . . , (Xn,n)), we let Ω(G) = {(O 1, . . . , On): O i ⊆ Xi for all i ∈ N}, i.e., the set
of possible outcomes of G (see Section 3.1). A possible outcome (O 1, . . . , On) is comprehensive if for each i, O i is a compre-
hensive subset of Xi . It is consistent if
⋃
i∈N O i is consistent.
For any two possible outcomes O , O ′ ∈ Ω(G), we write
• O  O ′ iff O i ⊇ O ′i for all i;• O  O ′ iff O  O ′ but O = O ′;
• O  O ′ iff O i ⊃ O ′i for all i.
Based on the above concepts, we are now able to discuss the game-theoretic properties of the simultaneous concession
solution. Firstly, the solution trivially satisﬁes the following Individual rationality:
f (G) (∅, . . . ,∅)
This is not interesting because the property is satisﬁed by any bargaining solution (see Deﬁnition 7). However, the following
strong version of the property is appealing, which says that as long as a negotiation does not end with disagreement, none
of the players receives empty gain.
Proposition 1. Disagreement and Contract independence imply the following property
• (Strong individual rationality) f (G)  (∅, . . . ,∅) unless f (G) = (∅, . . . ,∅).
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ment situation. Thus Disagreement implies f (G) = (∅, . . . ,∅). Assume that the proposition holds for any game in which the
height equals k. Now consider a game G whose height L = k + 1. Let G ′ be the maximal proper subgame G . By Contract
independence, f (G) = f (G ′). According to Lemma 1, the height of G ′ is k. By induction assumption, f (G ′)  (∅, . . . ,∅) unless
f (G ′) = (∅, . . . ,∅). So does f (G) because f (G) = f (G ′). 
Next we consider Pareto optimality. Obviously it is not reasonable to require a bargaining solution to be maximal in
terms of set inclusion without requiring the outcome to be comprehensive and consistent. Even though we impose compre-
hensiveness and consistency on any possible outcome, strong Pareto optimality is still not attainable because the domain of
problems to which our model applies is discrete (so is non-convex, see [5]). However, we have the following variation of
weak Pareto optimality.
Proposition 2. The simultaneous concession solution satisﬁes the following property
• (Weak Pareto optimality) If f (G) = (∅, . . . ,∅), there is no comprehensive consistent outcome O ∈ Ω(G) such that O  f (G).
Proof. Given a bargaining game G = ((Xi,i))i∈N , by the construction of the simultaneous concession solution, if F (G) =
(∅, . . . ,∅), then F (G) = (X>μ1 , . . . , X>μn ), where μ is the minimal rounds of concessions of the game (see Deﬁnition 8).
Suppose that there were a comprehensive consistent outcome O = (O 1, . . . , On) ∈ Ω(G) such that O  F (G). For each
i ∈ N , we have Fi(G) ⊂ O i ⊆ Xi , which implies that X>μ−1i ⊆ O i (obviously μ > 0). Since
⋃
i∈N O i is consistent, so does⋃
i∈N X
>μ−1
i , which contradicts the deﬁnition of μ. 
5. Continuous domain
We have introduced a purely qualitative solution to the bargaining problems in discrete domains. In this section, we
demonstrate that our solution is also applicable to continuous domains via a procedure of discretization. More importantly,
the process of discretization reveals the connection between the logic-based bargaining solution and the numerical bargain-
ing solutions.
To make the process easy to understand, let us consider a well-known bargaining scenario: bargaining over the partition
of a cake (see, for instance, [21]). Two players, A and B, bargain over the partition of a cake of size π (π > 0). The set of
possible agreements is Φ = {(xA, xB): 0  xA  π and xB = π − xA}. For each xi ∈ [0,π ], Ui(xi) is player i’s utility from
obtaining a share xi of the cake, where player i’s utility function Ui : [0,π ] →  is strictly increasing and continuous.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the disagreement point is d = (U A(0),UB(0)). Let
Ω = {(uA,uB): U A(xA) = uA and UB(xB) = uB for some (xA, xB) ∈ Φ}
Then (Ω,d) is the numerical game that represents the bargaining problem.
To represent the bargaining situation in the logical model, we ﬁrst have to discretize the problem. Let LA and LB be two
non-zero natural numbers, the granularity in which each player wants to discretize the problem. Let L = min{LA, LB}. For











Informally, we can assume that the utility of a player represents her degree of satisfaction on the share of the cake she
gains. Each player i ranks her satisfaction in Li levels from Ui(0) to Ui(π). Note that LA is not necessarily equal to LB .
Pi(l) then represents the demand of player i that she requests a share, which can bring her a satisfaction at least to level l.
For instance, Pi(Li) represents the demand that player i wants the whole cake, which will bring her to the highest level of
satisfaction.
We assume that each player knows the rule of the game: the total shares the two players can request should not be more than
π . This rule can be expressed by a set, R , of logical statements. The elements of R are in the form ¬(P A(k) ∧ P B(l)) ∈ R .




















Let T represent the following commonsense: for each player, as long as a demand for a bigger share is satisﬁed, any demand for
a smaller share is also satisﬁed. Formally, T contains the statements in the form Pi(k) → Pi(l), where Pi(k) → Pi(l) ∈ T if and
only if k l for all 1 k, l Li and i ∈ {A, B}. We write C = R ∪ T .
Let G = ((XA,A), (XB ,B)) be the bargaining game, where
XA = C ∪
{
P A(1), P A(2), . . . , P A(LA)
}
XB = C ∪
{
P B(1), P B(2), . . . , P B(LB)
}
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Demand hierarchies of numerical bargaining.
Player A Player B
C ∪ {P A(1)} C ∪ {P B (1)}
P A(2) P B (2)
· · · · · ·
P A(LA) P B (LB )
The orderings A and B are denoted by Table 1 (the higher the more ﬁrmly kept).16








=min{k: C ∪ {P A(1), . . . , P A(LA − k)}∪ {P B(1), . . . , P B(LB − k)} is consistent}




























Therefore the simultaneous concession solution of the game gives the following outcome:
1. if μ L, F (G) = (∅,∅); otherwise,
2. F (G) = (C ∪ {P A(LA − μ)},C ∪ {P B(LB − μ)}).
The condition μ  L means that the bargaining goes to the situation in which one of the players is forced to give up
everything (the game knowledge and a share of the cake). Thus the game will end with disagreement. If this is not the case,
an agreement will be reached, which should contain, among others, the statements P A(LA − μ) and P B(LB − μ). In other










































































Note that instead of giving the actual value of the bargaining outcome, the solution speciﬁes an interval as its estimation
of the bargaining outcome. This is due to the process of discretization. Proposition 3 will show that with the reﬁnement of
discretization, the estimation converges to a single point.
For a better understanding of the discretization procedure, let us consider an instance of the problem (see also [44]).
Assume that player A has a linear utility scale of its share, U A(xA) = xA , and player B has a utility scale that is proportional
to the square of his share, UB(xB) = x2B . Let us assume that π = 100 and LA = LB = 10. Then for each l (1 l  10), P A(l)
represents the statement “xA  10l” (i.e., U A(xA)  (1 − lL A )U A(0) + lL A U A(π)) and P B(l) represents “xB  10
√
10l” (i.e.,
UB(xB)  (1 − lLB )UB(0) + lLB U B(π)). The demand hierarchy of each player represents the player’s demands, the schedule
of concessions at each round, and the player’s knowledge of the game rules (see Table 1). It is not hard to know that
μ = 7. Therefore the simultaneous concession solution gives an estimation of the bargaining outcome as: xA ∈ [30,45.2]
and xB ∈ [54.8,70] (Table 2 demonstrates the bargaining procedure).
16 Note that each player ranks the game rule and commonsense highest. The ranking of the other demands follows exactly the natural order of concessions,
i.e., the demands that have to be dropped earlier are ranked lower.
17 Note that Pi(k) → Pi(l) ∈ C if k l.
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Bargaining over the partition of a cake.
Round Player A’s demand Player B’s demand Agreement
0 xA  100 xB  100.0 ×
1 xA  90 xB  94.9 ×
2 xA  80 xB  89.4 ×
3 xA  70 xB  83.7 ×
4 xA  60 xB  77.5 ×
5 xA  50 xB  70.7 ×
6 xA  40 xB  63.2 ×
7 xA  30 xB  54.8
√
Notice that both the Nash solution (33.3,66.7) and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (38.2,61.8) belong to the range (see
Appendix A for the deﬁnitions of these solutions). Surprisingly, with the reﬁnement of the discretization, the prediction
is no longer in favor of the Nash solution but is approaching the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. For instance, when LA =
LB = 20, the solution gives the range xA ∈ [35,40.8] and xB ∈ [59.2,65]. When LA = LB = 100, the solution ranges become
xA ∈ [38,38.4] and xB ∈ [61.6,62]. The following proposition shows that the simultaneous concession solution is actually an
approximation of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.
































where L = LA = LB .
Proof. First we calculate the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Since both players’ utility functions are strictly increasing, the
ideal point of the bargaining game is (U A(π),UB(π)). Any point in the segment of the line connecting the disagreement
point (U A(0),UB(0)) and the ideal point can be represented as (tU A(π) + (1 − t)U A(0), tU B(π) + (1 − t)UB(0)), where





t ∈ [0,1]: U A(xA) = tU A(π) + (1− t)U A(0) and
UB(xA) = tU B(π) + (1− t)UB(0)
}
Let t0 ∈ [0,1] such that U A(x∗A) = t0U A(π) + (1− t0)U A(0) and UB(x∗B) = t0UB(π) + (1− t0)UB(0).
Next we show that (x∗A, x∗B) satisﬁes Eqs. (5) and (6). To this end, let xA = U−1A (μL U A(0) + (1 − μL )U A(π)) and xB =
U−1B (
μ
L U B(0) + (1− μL )UB(π)). It follows that U A(xA) = μL U A(0) + (1− μL )U A(π) and UB(xB) = μL U B(0) + (1− μL )UB(π).
By Eq. (4), we have xA + xB  π . Since x∗A + x∗B = π , we entail t0  1− μL (note that U A and UB are strictly increasing). We
have established that xA  x∗A and xB  x∗B .
On the other hand, x∗A = π − x∗B  π − xB . Similarly, we have x∗B = π − x∗A  π − xA . Therefore we have proven that
x∗A ∈ [xA,π − xB ] and x∗B ∈ [xB ,π − xA].
Finally we prove Eqs. (7) and (8). Let xA = U−1A (μ−1L U A(0) + (1 − μ−1L )U A(π)) and xB = U−1B (μ−1L U B(0) + (1 −
μ−1
L )UB(π)). Note that μ > 0 because π > 0. By Eq. (4), we entail that xA + xB > π . Notice that (U A(xA),UB(xB)) is on the
segment of the line connecting the disagreement point and the ideal point, we know that x∗A  xA and x∗B  xB because U A
and UB are strictly increasing. Therefore, to show Eqs. (7) and (8), we only have to prove that limL→∞(xA − xA) = 0 and
limL→∞(xB − xB) = 0. Obviously limL→∞(U A(xA) − U A(xA)) = 0. Since U A is strictly increasing and continuous, U−1A exists
and is continuous. Therefore limL→∞(xA − xA) = 0. Similarly limL→∞(xB − xB) = 0. 
Although the procedure we described above is based on the cake partition problem, it is easy to see that the approach
is applicable to any single-issue continuous bargaining with strictly increasing and continuous utility functions.
6. Conclusion and related work
In this paper we introduced a logic-based axiomatic model of bargaining for qualitative bargaining analysis. With the
model a bargaining situation is described by a set of propositional statements and bargainers’ preferences are represented by
total pre-orders. We proposed a solution to n-person bargaining problems based on the assumption of minimal simultaneous
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that the solution is applicable not only to bargaining problems in discrete domains but also problems in continuous domains.
In the latter case the solution gives an approximation of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.
The key to our approach is the way in which the bargainers’ attitudes towards risk are expressed. We describe bar-
gainers’ physical demands in logical statements together with the ordinal representation of preferences. A player’s attitude
towards risk is reﬂected by the player’s preferences over conﬂicting demands. A risk-averse player tends to give lower pref-
erences to conﬂicting demands in order to reduce the risk of breakdown, whereas a risk-loving player would rather give
lower preference to the conﬂicting demands to protract a negotiation in order to gain more beneﬁt. We have observed
that logical relations among bargainers’ demands play an important role in the bargaining model. It is the combination of
ordinal preferences and logical consistency that provides a medium for the expression of bargainers’ risk postures. Such a
representation is much more natural than the representation through non-linearity of utility functions.
Our bargaining solution is built on ordinal preferences; therefore it is an ordinal solution. Most existing work on ordinal
bargaining solutions comes with conditions. Shapley, Kibris, Safra and Samet showed the existence of ordinal solutions to
the problems with no less than three players [14,35,40]. Calvo and Peters showed that ordinal solutions exist if at least one
player is cardinal [3]. As mentioned in Section 1, Rubinstein et al.’s solution requires each player to provide a preference
ordering on the space of lotteries over the set of possible agreements [33]. O’Neill et al.’s solution gives an outcome which
is a limit of a family of bargaining solutions in continuous domains [25]. In contrast, the solution proposed in this paper is
applicable to any n-player bargaining problem with no constraints on the number or the type of players.
We would like to remark that our framework provides a naive solution to multi-issue bargaining. The analysis of multi-
issue bargaining can be extremely complicated. Multi-issue bargaining problems are mostly procedure-dependent, thus
axiomatic analysis becomes much harder. Almost all existing research on multi-issue bargaining is based on non-cooperative
models, such as [6,7,11,43]. Axiomatic analysis requires aggregation of preferences on issues. The simplest and most com-
monly used assumption is additivity of utility over issues [28]. With additivity, a multi-issue bargaining problem can be
reduced to a single-issue problem, which is less interesting [29]. Unlike the existing work on multi-issue bargaining, we
describe negotiation terms in logical statements. The relations between bargaining issues can be speciﬁed by logical con-
nectives. With the beneﬁt of the expressiveness of logical language, our solution has clear advantages in dealing with
bargaining situations with complicated relations among bargaining issues and bargaining problems in which quantitative
analysis are hard to apply. Such bargaining situations are common in legal bargaining, labor bargaining, political bargaining
and family bargaining.
As one of the frameworks for conﬂict resolution, this work has a close relationship with the axiomatic models of belief
revision, belief merging and belief arbitration. In fact, the axioms Consistency and Collective rationality are fundamental
assumptions for all these operations [4,9,15,18]. The idea of simultaneous concessions is also applicable to belief merging.18
Nevertheless, the differences between bargaining and belief merging are obvious. For merging, the information sources are
passive therefore we can optimize the outcome of merging. However, in a bargaining, bargainers take initiative. The outcome
of bargaining purely relies on bargainers’ strategies. For example, assume a bargaining situation ((X1,1), (X2,2)) as
follows:
• X1 = {p,q} and X2 = {p,¬q};
• p ≈1 q and p ≈2 ¬q.
Then the bargaining ends with disagreement because no player is prepared to compromise. However, from the belief merg-
ing point of view, it is reasonable to assume that the merging of these two information sources contains p (for instance,
Axiom A7 in [18]). In addition, a bargaining model can also partially encode players’ strategic reasoning. Suppose that
player 1 is risk-averse who is willing to give up q in order to keep p, i.e., p 1 q; while player 2 is a risk-lover who
creates a dummy demand p ∨ ¬p and adds it to her demand set in order to circumvent a compulsory concession, i.e.,
p ≈2 ¬q 2 p ∨¬p. The outcome of bargaining will then be ({p}, {p,¬q}). Note that player 2 does not lose anything, which
shows another difference between bargaining and belief merging (see footnote 18).
There have been a few other frameworks for negotiation or bargaining built upon, or in the spirit of, belief revision
theory. Booth proposed a negotiation model based on multi-agent belief contraction (or social contraction) [2]. Zhang et al.
introduced the idea of modeling negotiation as a process of mutual belief revision [45]. Meyer et al. discussed the logical
properties of a negotiation model based on AGM theory [19,20]. However, none of these works provided an axiomatic model
of negotiation with characterization of players’ preference orderings.
This work is part of an ongoing project on logical analysis of bargaining reasoning. In [46], we proposed a bargaining
model in which negotiation items were represented in propositional logic but players’ preferences are represented numer-
ically. Based on such a semi-quantitative model, we demonstrated that the Nash solution is still applicable if we apply
lotteries (randomization) to the set of possible agreements. In [47], we removed the requirement of randomization and
constructed a bargaining solution so that it can be characterized by a combination of logical axioms and game-theoretic
18 For instance, if we impose the rule – “a merging operation must not give preference to any sources” – on a belief merging operator, then we can have an
axiom saying that “whenever two belief bases are logically inconsistent, none of them can be fully retained in the merging outcome” (Axiom A4 in [15]).
D. Zhang / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1307–1322 1321axioms. In [44], we introduced a bargaining model in which bargaining items are described by logical statements and
players’ preferences represented in pre-orders. Based on such a purely qualitative model, a logic-based bargaining solution
was constructed. In this paper, we developed an axiomatic model for the solution, thereby laying down a foundation for
the logic-based cooperative theory of bargaining. Meanwhile, the logic-based axiomatic model sheds light on the study of
logical analysis on strategic bargaining reasoning.
There are a number of challenging issues on bargaining reasoning that need to be addressed in strategic models (or
non-cooperative models) of bargaining.19 Firstly, the axiomatic model abstracts all the items that a player wants the ﬁnal
agreement to contain as the demands of the player. However, as we have seen in Example 1, some of these demands may
represent the player’s beliefs, goals or desired constraints. Identifying the roles of these speciﬁc demands in the player’s
strategic reasoning requires a model of the player and a model of the bargaining procedure. Secondly, a cooperative theory
of bargaining assumes that the information about bargainers’ preferences is available for bargaining analysis. However, from
each player’s point of view, such information is private and disclosure of the information would lose the players their
bargaining power. The investigations on the possibility of one player manipulating a bargaining game using the knowledge
of other players’ private information also rely on a strategic model of bargaining. Finally, an interesting research direction for
the future is to study the ways in which coalitions of players inﬂuence bargaining outcomes, especially for knowledge-based
coalitions.
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Appendix A. Two classical game-theoretic bargaining solutions
To make the paper self-contained, we brieﬂy review the basic facts of the two classical game-theoretic bargaining so-
lutions: the Nash solution [23] and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution [13]. For more details on these bargaining solutions, the
reader is referred to [42].
In game theory, an n-player bargaining game is deﬁned as a pair (S,d), where S ⊆ n represents the feasible set that
can be derived from possible agreements and d ∈ S stands for the disagreement point. It is assumed that S is convex
and compact. A bargaining solution f is a function that assigns to each bargaining game (S,d) a unique point of S , i.e.,
f (S,d) ∈ S . A bargaining solution N is the Nash solution if for any bargaining game (S,d), N(S,d) is the maximizer of the
product
∏
1in(xi − di) over S .20
Nash showed that a bargaining solution f = N if and only if it satisﬁes the following axioms [23]:
• Pareto optimality: There is no y ∈ S such that y  f (S,d).
• Symmetry: If (S,d) is a symmetric game, then f i(S,d) = f j(S,d) for all i, j.
• Scale Invariance: For any positive aﬃne transformation τ = (τ1, . . . , τn), τ ( f (S,d)) = f (τ (S), τ (d)).
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If S ′ ⊆ S and f (S,d) ∈ S ′ , then f (S ′,d) = f (S,d).
A bargaining solution K S is the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (KS-solution) if for any bargaining game (S,d), KS(S,d) is the
maximal point of S on the segment connecting d to a(S,d), where ai(S,d) =max{xi: x ∈ S & x d} for all i.
Kalai and Smorodinsky showed that a solution f = KS for 2-person bargaining games if and only if it satisﬁes Pareto
optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance as well as the following Restricted Monotonicity [13]:
• Restricted Monotonicity: If S ′ ⊆ S and a(S ′,d) = a(S,d), then f (S,d) f (S ′,d).
In spite of the large number of other solutions that have been proposed in the literature, these two solutions are most
inﬂuential in game theory (see [42] for a comprehensive survey).
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